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Introduction 
 
 
EU Options on Russia and the 
Eastern Partners 
“Cooperative Confrontation” as the Guiding Principle beyond the Riga Summit 
Kai-Olaf Lang and Barbara Lippert 
Moscow’s hegemonic stance on the post-Soviet space and its provocations in Ukraine 
force the European Union to find strategic clarity in its eastern neighbourhood. Often in 
the midst of discontinuous internal reform processes, the countries to the Union’s east 
find themselves hanging between a vague “wider Europe” proposal from Brussels and 
Moscow’s increasingly forceful idea of a “wider Russia”. At the May 2015 Riga Summit the 
EU heads of state and government will meet with their counterparts from the Eastern 
Partnership, including the new associates Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine. The EU should 
grant these countries political guarantees, material assistance and European perspec-
tives. But the European Union can only develop bilateral and plurilateral European per-
spectives if it faces up to the Russian factor and realigns its relations with Moscow on 
the Eastern Policy triangle of stability, cooperation and norm-driven transformation. 
 
In 2009, with the Eastern Partnership, the 
European Union established a structured 
policy of closer relations with its immediate 
neighbours in eastern Europe, as well as 
in the southern Caucasus. This move took 
account of both the Union’s geographical 
and political eastward expansion and the 
political and institutional transformations 
in the post-Soviet space. 
Interests and Objectives in the East 
By instituting the European Neighbour-
hood Policy and later the Eastern Partner-
ship, the European Union recognised – 
initially hesitantly, then increasingly deci-
sively – the fact of governmental and thus 
strategic plurality in the territory of the 
former Soviet Union. Alongside the domi-
nant relationship to Russia, the European 
Union and its member states sought bilat-
eral cooperations with the “newly independ-
ent states” to their east. While cooperation 
with direct neighbours was initially sub-
sidiary or secondary to Russia, the Euro-
pean Union increasingly departed from 
this “Russia first” approach both in its self-
understanding and in its political practice. 
Cooperative relations with individual neigh-
bours and possible multilateral dialogue 
forums were now to be shaped by the prin-
ciple of self-determined bilateralism, even if 
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the axiom of benevolent involvement of 
Russia still applied. The essence of these 
equal and independent two-way relation-
ships is to bring countries immediate to 
the east economically, politically and nor-
matively closer to the European Union 
by supporting socio-economic and political/ 
institutional reforms. The process is driven 
by the hope of generating convergence 
and stability. Russia’s perception changed 
as it came to regard the European Union’s 
engagement as an intrusion threatening its 
near abroad, which it regards an immediate 
sphere of influence. Suddenly the candidate 
for a modernisation partnership became a 
geopolitical rival; indifference and mistrust 
gave way to rejection and hostility. 
The friction entered its hottest phase to 
date with the conflict over and in Ukraine, 
where the European Union and its member 
states found themselves confronted with a 
qualitatively new Russian “hard power” and 
an explicit anti-association policy. At this 
point they had only just begun implement-
ing an ambitious and difficult programme 
of reforms with selected neighbouring 
states, packaged in a new type of associa-
tion agreement with provisions for a deep 
and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA). 
The military escalation and humanitarian 
situation in Ukraine have forced the Euro-
pean Union into permanent crisis manage-
ment mode, with security issues and the 
search for diplomatic compromise domi-
nating its agenda. In the current clashes 
with Moscow over Ukraine, the Union must 
guard its interests and objectives in the 
eastern neighbourhood, possibly reformu-
lating them in the face of new circum-
stances. Subsequently, promoting security 
and stability, supporting inclusive coopera-
tion, and continuing to foster normative 
transformative change should be key prior-
ities of EU action. 
Particularly, the course of events com-
pels the Union to underline the axiom of 
its neighbourhood policy: autonomy in 
shaping and developing bilateral relations 
with partners. If it were to grant third 
parties substantial influence in order to 
neutralise their capacity to disrupt, this 
would not only harm the Union’s predict-
ability. Other external actors might also be 
encouraged to counteract European actions 
through preventive or reactive interven-
tions. Although the substance of the bilat-
eral partnerships may vary, the European 
Union should always make sure they are 
reform-friendly and modernisation-stimu-
lating, in order to guide neighbouring 
states towards social market economy, 
pluralist democratic models and better 
governance. 
At the same time, the European Union 
must be interested in maintaining coopera-
tive relations with Russia and keeping open 
the perspective of reviving them more ener-
getically. In view of the present situation, 
use should be made of the possibility to 
largely decouple certain areas – in the first 
place energy and international and global 
security – from conflicts of interest over 
“shared neighbourhoods”. There will, how-
ever, also be more volatile fields that can 
be directly harmed by the current conflict, 
such as trade and technological coopera-
tion. The question in the medium and long 
term is, in what areas – under the premise 
of Moscow’s constructive cooperation – a 
resumption of cooperation should be sought 
and to which, drawing lessons from the cur-
rent conflict, should less energy be dedicated. 
The European Union should also work, 
in the overall context of its relationships, to 
restore good relations, transparency and 
stability between Russia and its neighbours 
and among the neighbours. Principles such 
as openness to cooperation, multilateral 
alliances, compatibility of economic and 
trade areas, and amelioration of the con-
sequences of cooperation for all involved 
including Russia should continue to apply. 
Strategic Options for 
EU-Russia Relations 
EU-Russia relations need to be rethought in 
light of the Ukraine crisis and the war. The 
relationship is likely to be determined by 
a grave lack of trust and tense volatility for 
SWP Comments 32 
May 2015 
2 
a long time to come. Phases of pragmatism 
can be abruptly interrupted by reversals 
and partial escalations. At the same time 
the European Union is interested in pre-
dictable relations with structures and 
procedures that channel or at least struc-
ture conflict. The Union must base its 
Russia policy on the three tenets, which it 
has pursued in its Eastern Policy: a stable 
pan-European or regional order, coopera-
tion as the defining mode of action, and 
pursuit of a transformative and normative 
policy of support for reforms. The more 
weight the European Union can lend that 
triad, the greater its political credibility 
will be. Of the three fundamentally con-
ceivable options outlined below, “coopera-
tive confrontation” (Option 3) best serves 
the threefold objectives. 
Option 1: Strategic concert 
The option of a strategic concert is based on 
the idea that Russia possesses a fundamen-
tal interest in having at least an informal 
agreement on spheres of interest and in-
fluence in the shared neighbourhood. More-
over, Moscow has the power to stir trouble 
in the neighbourhood any time it chooses, 
with considerable potential for interven-
tion and escalation. Consequently, it is pro-
posed, the European Union would be ready 
to enter into a concert of interests. This 
would largely involve defining red lines for 
the individual shared neighbours’ relations 
to Moscow and Brussels and agreeing the 
parameters within which bilateral relation-
ships may develop. 
Such a circumscribed cohabitation would 
return the European Union to a barely dis-
guised “Russia first” policy, because Russian 
concerns would be excessively prioritised 
and a de facto condominium would emerge 
for the European part of the post-Soviet 
space. The Union would establish a kind of 
normative equidistance and sacrifice the 
principle of external and internal freedom 
of choice for the states between the Euro-
pean Union and Russia to a (supposedly) 
stability-promoting concord. An order thus 
configured would be chronically unstable, 
because it freezes the status quo while 
making little in the way of cooperative pro-
vision for dealing with the dynamics that 
inevitably arise in the neighbourhood coun-
tries, which are in transition and in at least 
some cases include strong pro-Western 
forces some of which would not simply ac-
cept deals done over their heads. The politi-
cal price for the European Union would be 
enormous. It would lose political credibility 
with its neighbours and permit Moscow 
to set limits to their transformations. This 
would make the Union an accomplice of 
the neo-autocratic Russia rather than an 
honest broker and advocate of the interests 
of democracy-seeking neighbours. However, 
Russia might in return offer constructive 
cooperation on other questions of interna-
tional politics that are of concern to the 
European Union. 
Inside the EU, this option would be unac-
ceptable to many of the Russia-critical and 
traditionally pro-Atlantic member states 
in eastern and northern Europe, whereas 
more “pragmatic” governments in all parts 
of the Union would be likely to be more 
amenable. Similar positions are proposed 
by the more than sixty signatories of the 
“appeal for a new policy of détente” of 
December 2014, including some prominent 
pragmatists from the Cold War era. On 
the academic front the option of a strategic 
concert fits with political recommenda-
tions prioritising the inviolability of the 
internal order (Kaim, Maull and Westphal) 
or arguing the imperative of security and 
order (“Ordnungssicherheit”, Baberowski). 
Option 2: Containment 
A policy built on containment would aim 
to limit Russia’s influence on its neighbours 
and within the European Union. The clas-
sical instruments would be dissociation 
and disengagement through block-building 
and downgrading of the relationship at all 
levels. Unlike in the Cold War era, contain-
ment could create the preconditions for 
both sides to return to a relaxation of the 
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relationship at some later stage: block-
building, is neither finished nor recognised 
as objective reality. Moreover, it is highly 
controversial. 
The containment option would demand 
close European-American coordination. In 
essence it would mean actively promoting 
Westernisation in the European Union’s 
(and NATO’s) eastern neighbourhoods and 
at least not excluding the option of future 
membership in Western alliance systems. 
EU and NATO membership would go hand 
in hand, as they did in the largely success-
ful expansion and transformation process 
in eastern and south-eastern Europe. 
While such an expansion policy might 
discourage Russia from pursuing destabili-
sation, at least in its immediate eastern 
European neighbourhood, the conflict 
dynamics and risks of continuing Russian 
escalation dominance and willingness to 
intervene would present a great danger to 
stability. Then the West would only be able 
to counter successfully if it was willing and 
able to bear high costs, to remain engaged 
even in the face of massive disruption, and 
to act in resolute unanimity. A further weak-
ness of this option is that it minimises pos-
sibilities for cooperation with Russia and 
would thus also impair those areas of the 
West’s relationship with Russia (such as 
international politics and energy) that have 
to date remained detached from the conflict. 
Such a containment policy would force 
the neighbours to choose one camp or the 
other and would prematurely cement dif-
ferentiations appearing among the Eastern 
Partnership. It would potentially contribute 
to the formation of two rigid blocs – the 
three associate countries (Moldova, Georgia 
and Ukraine) and the other neighbours – 
and exacerbate latent conflicts such as those 
over breakaway regions. 
The Union’s political credibility would 
depend on whether it was able to repeat 
the demonstration of its power of trans-
formation and unfold a magnetic attraction 
reaching to Russia’s borders. On questions 
of military security the Union would retain 
a junior role. This is the line of argument 
taken by Anne Applebaum and US foreign 
policy experts from the Republican side, 
as well as parts of the political spectrum in 
Poland and the Baltic states. 
Option 3: Cooperative confrontation 
The European policy of “cooperative con-
frontation” starts from the fact that the two 
sides’ ideas of order became irreconcilable 
after Russia abandoned the principles of 
the CSCE Final Act of Helsinki (1975) and 
the Charter of Paris (1990). The European 
Union can continue to adhere to these 
principles yet still seek an elementary inter-
action with Russia – basing its policy on a 
combination of interest-based selective co-
operation and containment of imperial 
power. It would thus be prepared for con-
flict and would support NATO’s policy of 
reassurance and extended deterrence in a 
“division of labour”. At the level of society, 
however, it would continue to develop con-
tacts and offer opportunities for communi-
cation. The sense and purpose of coopera-
tive confrontation would not be regime 
change in Russia. 
This option would involve a differentia-
tion in the value dimension in European 
Eastern Policy. While the European Union 
would maintain its paradigm of reconfigur-
ing its neighbours comprehensively and 
thus also normatively towards responsible 
governance, democratisation and market 
economy, it would also account for Russia’s 
peculiarity. Russia is different and may 
remain so. But it must respect any internal 
change its neighbours wish for. The Euro-
pean Union should abide by its policy of 
open-ended partial economic integration 
of its eastern neighbours, as proposed in 
the current association agreements, and 
continue to pursue the goals of value con-
vergence, democratisation and economic 
transformation. The superordinate goal 
of normative transformation does not in 
principle preclude continuing and develop-
ing cooperative relations even with undemo-
cratic countries, where the European Union 
will have to set the bar lower and resort to 
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different incentives than with countries 
that are more open towards reforms and 
Europeanisation. Regardless of the internal 
affairs of its direct neighbours, their wish 
for self-determination in foreign policy 
must be respected. The Union must make 
no agreements with third parties that 
would restrict that autonomy, nor pursue 
any active policy of “regime change”. 
Following this line, the European Union 
and its member states would unswervingly 
continue the EU-isation of willing neigh-
bouring states, and grant Russia absolutely 
no influence over their future relationship 
to the European Union. They would, how-
ever, offer compromises on the scope and 
depth of the hard security stance and con-
tinue to maintain a sample of fields of 
cooperation, such as energy, arms control, 
economic contacts and global hotspots. In 
contrast to the containment option, the 
European Union would support and shape 
a status for neighbouring countries that 
included security non-alignment for a cer-
tain period (no eternity clause) or under 
certain conditions but impeded neither 
their European perspective nor its materi-
alisation. 
The European Union and NATO would 
have to agree on a division of labour. The 
associate countries could be brought grad-
ually into a closer relationship with NATO 
of the kind Sweden and Finland already 
have today. Despite ongoing ambivalences 
and the postponement of a decision on 
the question of membership in the Euro-
Atlantic structures, this could still mean 
a gain in security. If these processes were 
accompanied by corresponding diplomacy 
towards Russia, this would also contribute 
to an increase in regional stability. This is 
the thrust of proposals to contain Russia 
(HSFK-Report 2014) or directly hedge Putin’s 
illiberal strategy while keeping open per-
spectives of cooperation (Nye). 
The European Union cannot align its 
short- and medium-term Russia policy 
on the ideal of a pan-European structure, 
whether economic or political in nature. 
But within the scope of this option it can 
create pillars that could later be inserted 
into such a continental architecture. It 
would seek integration of Russia while at 
the same time ensuring that the neigh-
bours were able to preserve their political 
self-determination. Admittedly, Russia has 
shown no interest in such a constructive 
arrangement, which in essence would com-
prise compatible trade areas and economic 
spaces (European Economic Area and Eura-
sian Economic Union). 
But what if Moscow insists on pursuing 
the existing systemic rivalry with Brussels 
by military or other coercive means? The 
European Union would then have to stay 
its course, not abandoning a policy based 
on self-determination for its neighbours for 
the sake of a strategic concert to strike a 
“grand bargain”. Apart from endurance in 
implementing this concept, the Union will 
also have to demonstrate solidarity with 
the associated neighbours and bear the 
political and financial costs. Thus the stra-
tegic response to Russia’s actions would be 
to promote resilience among the Union’s 
neighbours and demonstrate patient con-
fidence in its own policy. 
Perspectives for the 
Eastern Partnership 
The three main elements that have charac-
terised the European Union’s policy towards 
Russia since the annexation of Crimea – 
sanctions against Russia’s economy and 
politicians, strengthening Ukraine, and 
continuing openness to dialogue with Mos-
cow – are compatible with the option of 
cooperative confrontation. But what is the 
future of neighbourhood relations aside 
and apart from crisis diplomacy? 
The Vilnius Summit of the Eastern Part-
nership in November 2013 was an impor-
tant milestone in the European Union’s 
relations with the six partners in its direct 
eastern neighbourhood: Armenia, Azerbai-
jan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. 
On the basis of their agreements with the 
European Union, the depth of cooperation 
sought in the medium term and the pros-
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pects of integration, these countries now 
fall into two camps. 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have con-
cluded association agreements that include 
a deep and comprehensive free trade area 
(DCFTA), and are thus on a course of eco-
nomic integration and political association. 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus each 
represent a special case. Because of its mem-
bership in the Eurasian Economic Union, 
Armenia is exploring a special relationship 
to the European Union below that of asso-
ciation agreement with DCFTA. This could 
produce a model for countries whose inter-
est in political transformation is limited 
but are nonetheless motivated by the domi-
nant Russian vector in their external rela-
tions to diversify their economic and prob-
ably also political ties. Azerbaijan prefers 
purely economic bilateral relations with 
the European Union, labelled as a strategic 
modernisation partnership. As was already 
known before Vilnius, their interest is lim-
ited to innovation and industrial coopera-
tion – demonstrating the prevalence of 
differentiation within the Eastern Partner-
ship space. Belarus remains a specific case 
where there is not even a partnership and 
cooperation agreement (PCA) as a baseline 
and the European Union pursues a sanctions 
policy (however granting visa facilitation to 
specific groups and supporting NGOs). The 
European Union could send a message to 
Belarus by seeking a PCA concentrating on 
economic contacts and bilateral political 
relations above the working level, and could 
also gradually relax its sanctions without 
renouncing its public stance against politi-
cal justice and human rights violations. 
In all three countries the European Union 
should press for expansion of cooperation 
with civil society and development of mini-
mum standards for civil society engage-
ment. 
For Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, with 
which association agreements have already 
been concluded, the foremost need is for 
ambitious implementation strategies and 
assistance tailored to reform priorities. 
Aside from association agendas and action 
plans, administrative capacities must be 
understood as an overarching challenge 
located at different levels. Alongside the 
activities associated with association agree-
ments and DCFTAs in the three countries, 
the European Union must work deter-
minedly to seek pragmatic arrangements 
for the breakaway regions of Transnistria, 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, for Crimea, 
and foreseeably also for a future demarcat-
ed zone in Donbas. These regions and zones 
should participate at least partially in trade 
arrangements, and possibly even mobility. 
Beyond this, the European Union must 
develop an approach towards its neigh-
bours that encompasses all the instruments 
of external action including the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). 
In view of the conflicts involved, a “stand-
alone” association policy is inadequate. 
Following the model of the stabilisation 
and association processes for the Western 
Balkans, the European Union should con-
siderably step up its efforts in security policy 
as well as its diplomatic commitment in 
the associated countries and launch consid-
erably more initiatives addressed to them. 
Although Russia is an opponent and inter-
vention force in the post-Soviet space, the 
possibilities of foreign policy and security 
influence must still be explored within the 
parameters of cooperative confrontation. 
In the case of Ukraine it would be advisable 
to support reform of the security sector in a 
manner that extends beyond the small civil-
ian advisory mission (EUAM), for example 
considering targeted technical and manage-
ment consulting to modernise and realign 
the Ukrainian defence industry. Although 
that would generate political controversy 
within the European Union, it would be 
an effective compensation for the denial of 
NATO membership. 
Prospectively these efforts could be 
bundled and neighbouring countries offered 
European security partnerships. Doing so 
within the frame of the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
would imply at least toleration by Russia. 
SWP Comments 32 
May 2015 
6 
Multilaterally the establishment of an EU 
Eastern Partnership security format would 
be a visible sign of greater foreign policy 
and security engagement by the European 
Union, while an eastern European equiva-
lent of the Stability Pact for the Western 
Balkans would open the door to diplomatic 
support including international partners; 
priorities would be reconstruction, eco-
nomic development, regional cooperation 
and coordination of aid, possibly with the 
later addition of a special coordinator. 
The Eastern Partnership is currently a 
weakly structured symbolic framework that 
offers a great deal of scope for elasticity and 
cooperation tailored to individual partners. 
This “EU plus six forum” embodies a politi-
cal statement of the European Union’s 
special responsibility for a broad swathe of 
its neighbourhood. Aside from that, this 
framework will continue to offer possibili-
ties for contacts with these very different 
neighbours. However, the European Union 
could be interested in the multilateral com-
ponent of the Eastern Partnership reflect-
ing the differentiation among the six, for 
example by establishing a politically more 
contoured multilateral format with the 
three partners that are closer to the Union, 
presently Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine. 
Despite the failure of similar initiatives in 
the 1990s, such as the congress of Europe 
and structured political dialogues, such a 
format might find greater acceptance in 
countries whose internal conditions and 
external circumstances are very much more 
problematic. 
Either way, the European Union will be 
confronted in Riga with the question of 
whether it wants to enter into a political 
obligation along the lines of the Thessalo-
niki Declaration for the Western Balkans 
(2003). Presumably it will not (yet). But the 
European Union can still announce that 
association need not be the final state of 
relations and that the Union remains an 
open community. The central message of 
Riga would be that neither war nor crisis 
can deter the European Union and its asso-
ciates, but instead they are doing all they 
can to exploit the political, economic and 
social potential of the association agree-
ments. The European Union’s stance should 
be one of material generosity and critical po-
litical solidarity, but should also be guided 
by transformation-driven stringency that 
grants no unearned political discounts. The 
goal must be to improve the chances for 
both stability and reform across the neigh-
bourhood. 
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